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Active behavioral fingerprinting of wireless devices
Sergey Bratus, Cory Cornelius, David Kotz, Daniel Peebles
Institute for Security Technology Studies
Dartmouth College

ABSTRACT
We propose a simple active method for discovering facts
about the chipset, the firmware or the driver of an 802.11
wireless device by observing its responses (or lack thereof) to
a series of crafted non-standard or malformed 802.11 frames.
We demonstrate that such responses can differ significantly
enough to distinguish between a number of popular chipsets
and drivers. We expect to significantly expand the number
of recognized device types through community contributions
of signature data for the proposed open fingerprinting framework. Our method complements known fingerprinting approaches, and can be used to interrogate and spot devices
that may be spoofing their MAC addresses in order to conceal their true architecture from other stations, such as a
fake AP seeking to engage clients in complex protocol frame
exchange (e.g., in order to exploit a driver vulnerability).
In particular, it can be used to distinguish rogue APs from
legitimate APs before association.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Tools for fingerprinting networked devices, i.e., discovering facts about their software, OS or hardware that their
operators may want to conceal or misrepresent, are nowadays an indispensable part of security assessment and penetration testing toolkits, and are routinely included in popular GNU/Linux and other security-conscious OS distributions. They help administrators to inventory and penetration testers to reconnoiter networks; they are used to locate vulnerable systems and unauthorized devices; they are
useful for interrogating and outing suspected masquaraders.
These tools, however, operate at the network layer (L3) and
transport layer (L4) exclusively.

802.11 L2 attacks and offensive fingerprinting.
Several vulnerabilities recently discovered in different implementations of the 802.11 MAC layer resulted in increased
interest in fingerprinting 802.11 platforms for both offensive
and defensive uses. The Blackhat 2006 public demonstra-
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tion of a kernel-level exploit for an 802.11 card driver has
validated predictions that the complexity of 802.11 protocols meant exploitable vulnerabilities and generated significant amounts of publicity. This release was accompanied
by reports of successful fingerprinting of hardware-software
combinations, based on their link-layer behavior, as a means
of conducting precisely targeted attacks [5]. Shortly after,
the so-called “Month of kernel bugs” (see, e.g., [3]) further
proved the point. Suddenly, targeted attacks on 802.11 platforms became a frightening reality.

An inspiration: TCP/IP fingerprinting.
The current situation somewhat resembles that of TCP/IP
stacks of the 90s that used to fall to attacks as trivial as the
infamous “land”, “bonk” and “teardrop”.1 It is further exacerbated by the fact that, in the case of 802.11, products
were widely released before many fine points of the protocol
were specified, as vendors were driven to “differentiate” their
products rather than achieve interoperability.2
The need for testing TCP/IP stack implementations (in
particular, for hard to mitigate kernel-level vulnerabilities)
led to development of test suites such as PROTOS [1]. Differences in the implementation of TCP/IP stacks also presented ample opportunities for fingerprinting. In particular,
IP fragmentation and features of UDP and TCP have been
observed to allow fingerprinting IP stacks by vendor and
by OS version and become the basis of classical tools, e.g.,
nmap, xprobe2, and the passive p0f. They were also shown
to have major implications for network intrusion detection
(e.g., Ptacek and Newsham [11]). Widespread offensive use
of target stack fingerprinting techniques created interest in
thwarting such reconnaissance as a defensive measure for
vulnerable TCP/IP stacks (e.g., Provos [10] and Wang [13]).
These examples and tools serve as an inspiration for our
fingerprinting approach.
With the emergence of 802.11 driver attacks and platformspecific attacks (not necessarily on the link layer itself, but
targeting other platform-specific software) offensive use of
fingerprinting will, no doubt, increase. We expect mobile
systems, including Wi-Fi appliances and wireless phones, to
be particularly vulnerable (in part, due to market pressures
affecting the mobile software-development process and the
added complexities of patching mobile systems).
1
http://insecure.org/sploits/land.ip.DOS.html,
http://insecure.org/sploits/95.NT.fragmentation.bonk.html,
http://insecure.org/sploits/linux.fragmentation.teardrop.html
2
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Fingerprinting for defense.
We consider two basic use scenarios for defensive wireless
fingerprinting. In the first scenario, suppose that the owner
of a client station either lacks the cryptographic capabilities
necessary to authenticate the access point and is concerned
that the latter may be an “evil twin” set up to engage the
user’s station in a man-in-the-middle attack, or, even though
strong authentication of the AP is possible in later stages, is
concerned that an “evil twin” may be seeking to compromise
it via a driver or supplicant vulnerability even before the
cryptographic verification is complete.
Thus the user may want to gain additional information by
fingerprinting the AP before further communicating with it.
Since APs by design respond to a wider range of stimuli
than stations, this scenario naturally fits active fingerprinting. Moreover, if the feared attack is a targeted one, the
user may entirely lack the opportunity to perform passive
fingerprinting, since the “evil twin” may not provide such an
opportunity to profile itself.
The second scenario is that of a network administrator
concerned with keeping unauthorized equipment from his
network, such as cheap commodity access points, which employees bring in without permission, testing or configuration
assessment. Even if an employee introducing such a device
changes its wireless interface’s MAC address and other settings, active fingerprinting is likely to expose it as being of
different architecture than the approved devices.
A variant of this scenario could be that of an administrator
desiring to ensure that only certain configurations of mobile
stations are allowed to interact with the network, and is
concerned that users might replicate the credentials and the
MAC address of an allowed device on a device of different
architecture. Engaging the device in an active fingerprinting
conversation to provide an extra degree of assurance that it
is what it claims to be may then be useful. In this case
the administrator can even configure his APs to ignore the
device (and thus limit their potential exposure to hostile
behavior) until it passes some fingerprinting tests.
Our active fingerprinting method can be used in the above
scenarios to help protect a vulnerable client from a rogue
access point attempting to masquerade as a part of the approved infrastructure long enough to exploit the client before
it fails a credentials check on its way to association, or vice
versa.

2.

RELATED WORK AND OUR APPROACH

There exists a wide variety of physical layer fingerprinting methods, including signal, timing, and frequency analysis, capable of fingerprinting individual radio devices well
beyond their general architecture. We take a much more
limited approach by concentrating on 802.11 L2 implementation differences and behaviors that (a) can be observed
with a commodity card in RF monitor mode, and (b) do not
require passive observation of existing connections, but can
instead be (c) reliably elicited by sending (preferably few)
stimulus frames that commodity cards can inject (possibly
under patched drivers). In short, we are limiting ourselves
to a kit accessible to a dedicated network administrator.
Works meeting the first requirement (a) include passive
client station fingerprinting techniques [7], and an empirical
analysis of heterogeneity 802.11 MAC implementations [8],
which mentions the possibility of fingerprinting by observing
characteristics such as random backoff interval calculation,

and handling of power management.3 In our opinion, the
Cache [4] method for driver and chipset fingerprinting based
on observed values of the Duration field, deserves a special
mention for demonstrating that in a MAC layer as complex
as 802.11 even a single 16 bit integer field can provide enough
information about a particular implementation.
In this paper we explore a complementary active approach
to fingerprinting, based on responses of 802.11 MAC implementations to malformed and non-standard frames. Our
goal was to identify the simplest fingerprintable behaviors
that could be elicited by sending such frames to APs and
stations and used to distinguish between chipset and the
software or firmware involved.
Although we plan to use statistical fingerprints in our future work, in this paper we further narrowed the scope to
non-statistical behaviors such as differing responses (or the
lack thereof) to certain flag bits set or cleared, and to other
fields having unusual values. We show that such reactions
may be enough to recognize devices providing wrong information about their manufacturer, chipset, etc.
This active approach to fingerprinting has both inherent
strengths and weaknesses. Unlike passive approaches, it may
provide a negative answer, i.e., give reasonable assurances
that a given implementation is not what it claims to be,
much faster than the passive ones, in the best cases after
exchanging only a few stimulus frames with the target. On
the other hand, it is “noisy” by definition and thus more
likely to draw the attention of a wireless IDS with its stimulus frames and might even crash some vulnerable devices.
Offensive uses of active fingerprinting are thus limited to
scenarios where the attacker does not care about immediate
detection of his transmissions by either a rule-based or an
anomaly-based link-layer aware WIDS.

3.

METHOD

In this section we describe our active fingerprinting approach. We started with the hypothesis that different implementations of 802.11b/g would react differently to nonstandard events, and, perhaps, in the interest of performance, even cut corners when sanity-checking frames that
require a fast response.
To structure our tests, we charted all possible combinations of features derived from the fields of the 802.11 MAC
header, and marked non-standard or unusual combinations
(the full chart can be found in our Technical Report [2]).
In particular, we singled out combinations of frame types,
subtypes and Frame Control flags either prohibited by the
standard, not explicitly prohibited but of unclear utility for
the standard protocols, or simply unlikely to occur in practice. We then drafted a number of scenarios unlikely to
occur in a normal network and built BAFFLE,4 a generator
and injector of non-standard and malformed frames. Our
injection framework uses the LORCON library.5 We use a
custom tool written in the Ruby programming language for
3
The authors also note the use of vendor-specific information
elements in beacons and point out that these can be used to
identify the manufacturer of the AP. However, faking them
is not hard either.
4
BAFL stands for Behavioral Active Fingerprinting of the
Link (layer); the rest of the name suggested itself after several devices we tested became baffled by our stimuli and
required hard reboots.
5
http://www.802.11mercenary.net/lorcon/

shaping the frames. Its design was informed by the Scapy
tool.6

3.1

Stimulus-response approach

To fingerprint a wireless station we use a series of tests, the
outcomes of which are combined in a decision tree structure.
We describe an automated method for constructing decision
trees in Section 4.4. Such a method will become necessary
when the database of tests reaches significant size, as we plan
to publish our testing tools and incorporating contributed
test results. Currently the decision tree can easily be managed manually.
Each test involves sending a “stimulus” frame to a station
and observing the response, which is then tested, and the
outcome of the test determines transition to the next decision tree node. The responses considered are of the following types: (a) any frame transmitted by the station within
timeout of the stimulus, (b) a frame of specific type and
subtype transmitted by the station within a given time-out
period, and (c) lack of any transmitted frames for the given
time-out period.
Due to the asymmetric nature of the interactions between
a station and the access point, the chosen scenarios fall into
two separate classes for APs and client stations.

3.2

Fingerprinting an access point

On an open 802.11 network without additional cryptographic authentication, client stations lack the capability to
authenticate an access point. Therefore fingerprinting an access point can serve as additional assurance for the mobile
user that she is not dealing with an “evil twin”.
We identified the following active fingerprinting scenarios:
1. The FromDS and ToDS bits on a Probe Request are
expected to be cleared. We send Probe Request frames
with one or both of these bits set. Some APs (most
notably Linksys WRT54g7 ) responded to such Probe
Requests with their usual Probe Response, whereas
others did not.
2. Responses to Probe Requests with other Frame Control bits set (in particular, More Fragments, Power
Management, More Data, and Order bits) differed between APs.
3. The FromDS and ToDS bits are expected to be cleared
on Authentication Requests. Other Frame Control bits
are also expected to be cleared on Authentication Requests.
4. As a variant of the previous two tests, the same is
applied to the Association Requests after a successful Authentication Request – Authentication Response
exchange.
5. Probe Requests and Authentication Requests are not
expected to be fragmented. The AP’s reaction to a
fragmented request may vary and thus be fingerprintable.
6. A Probe Request is expected to contain certain information elements such as those with the ESSID and
required rates. The reaction to Probe Requests without such elements may vary.
6
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7. Once a station is associated with an AP that supports
power saving, it can notify the AP with a Null Data
frame with the PS bit set. Other bits in the Frame
Control field are not expected to be set for such requests; the AP’s response to a Null Data frame with
these bits set may vary.

3.3

Fingerprinting a client station

Fingerprinting a station based on its responses may be
desirable when an open WLAN is expected to have only a
limited number of connecting stations using approved hardware. It can also be used to discover unexpected “substitutions” of one physical station for another (e.g., as a result
of interception or sharing of credentials). Many sites still
use MAC registration of Wi-Fi interfaces for keeping track
of users if not for actual access control; they might want to
occasionally check if any station substitution has occurred.
Due to the above mentioned asymmetry between the station and the AP, stations’ reactions are easiest to observe
when a station is either probing or is in the authenticated
and associated state. The stimuli for such responses are
likely to be more disruptive than those for the AP outlined
above, since they induce (or fail to induce) association or
authentication state changes. A well-written driver and network stack should, however, be able to restore the association without interrupting connections at the higher layers.
As a baseline, we must first measure the reaction of the
station to well-formed deauthentication and deassociation
frames that are meant to induce state transitions. A typical
client station attempts re-association and re-authentication
as per the standard 802.11 state machine. Note that:
1. Deauthentication and Deassociation frames are not expected to have certain Frame Control bits set (e.g.,
FromDS and ToDS). Stations may not react to malformed injected frames and continue in associated state.
2. The station’s response to undefined reason codes in
such frames may vary, ignoring them and continuing
in associated state, or making repeated attempts at
re-authentication, or loss of connectivity.
3. When the client station probes for a particular network, the answering Probe Response frames are not
expected to have certain FC flags set and are expected
to contain valid ESSID and Supported Rates information elements. Based on the results of processing a
response frame, the station may choose to proceed to
authentication or ignore the responding network. The
conditions under which the latter happens may differ
between implementations.
4. The number of retransmits a station would attempt
before giving up varies between implementations. As
a convenient example, we consider the number of retransmissions of a purposefully unacknowledged Authentication Request once the station has been lured
into attempting authentication. For example, we observed 14 retransmit attempts for the iPhone, 10 for a
MacBook Pro, around 126–127 for the Intel PRO/Wireless
3945ABG operating under an open source Linux driver,
and 3 for a Cisco 7920 wireless VOIP handset.
Although some drivers allow changing retransmit counts,
portable 802.11 devices typically do not expose it for
easy changes (such as the Cisco 7920).

5. When the Authentication–Association 4-way handshake
fails before completion, the reaction of the client station may vary; in particular, the number of attempts
to establish the association. For instance, we observed
the MacBook Pro sending apparently unlimited Probe
Requests even after notifying the user of a connection
failure, until the interface was manually brought down
or the user manually selected another network. The
iPhone, on the other hand, did not exhibit this behavior.
6. Presence or absence of beacon frames affects stations’
association behavior in different ways. For example,
we observed that the iPhone would not attempt to
connect to an AP that answered its broadcast Probe
Request unless it also sees beacon frames from that AP,
whereas for the MacBook Pro the absence of beacons
make no difference.8

4.

EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

This section describes our experimental setup for testing
the behavior of wireless stations. We also discuss some technical difficulties we encountered and ways to alleviate them.

4.1

Scanning and monitor platforms

Our testing system consists of an scanning platform and a
monitor platform that run the respective testing and monitoring processes. These processes can share the same machine and even the same wireless interface, but preferably
they should be physically separate for performance reasons.
The scanning platform is responsible for administering the
stimuli. For single stage stimulus-response scenarios that do
not require previous interaction with the device being fingerprinted, the scanning platform prepares and sends a series
of stimulus frames. When possible, a MAC address in the
frame identifies the particular test, e.g., malformed Probe
Requests or Probe Responses are sent from non-existing
stations and APs respectively. This allows us to speed up
and “parallelize” testing.9 The monitor platform sniffs the
responses (which, when possible, identify the corresponding stimulus by the crafted MAC address) and converts the
frame captures to the format suitable for the tests in the
decision tree. For training, processing the results of singlestage tests can also be done offline, using the resulting packet
capture file.
For multi-stage stimulus-response scenarios, in which the
actual stimulus frame comes after an exchange intended to
put the target into the state where the stimulus can elicit
the desired response, the scanning platform is also responsible for playing the right sequence of prerequisite frames,
emulating a normal station or an AP. Due to timing issues,
only basic functions can be emulated reliably on commodity
hardware.
We used the Atheros-based Ubiquity 802.11a/b/g card
with the (modified) madwifi-ng driver for both the scanning and the monitor platforms, with the LORCON injection framework on the scanning platform, and the RFMON
mode libpcap-based sniffing on the monitor platform.
8
In [6], the authors observed that some platforms would
ignore unicast Probe Responses unless they also received
beacons from the responding BSSID.
9
A similar technique is used by port scanners to avoid the
overhead of creating and maintaining connection data.

4.2

Filtering and performance issues

When operating our monitoring platform in the lab, we
experienced significant performance issues due to the high
population of our wireless network. To reduce packet loss we
found it necessary to delegate parts of the tests to the libpcap library’s BPF filter and thus speed up the more costly
tests performed on the captured frames above the libpcap
layer. Unfortunately, the BPF filtering language does not include support for elements of the 802.11 protocol (although
it accepts the wlan keyword, it is an alias for ether).
It does, however, support bitwise operations and tests on
bytes and words at specified offsets and Boolean expressions
on such tests, which it compiles into bytecode for the increased efficiency that we needed. Thus we designed a simple
filtering language exposing a set of 802.11 MAC header features similar to that of Wireshark’s display filtering language
and implemented a generator of BPF filter expressions accepted by libpcap. The improvement in performance allowed
us to conduct our experiments on our busy (40–90 APs on
a typical Kismet scan) network.

4.3

Iterating over the stimuli sets

When testing devices for stimuli that could distinguish
them from each other, we iterated over several subsets of the
non-standard and malformed frames. As described above,
we started with a subset of typically unused combinations of
frame fields, represented as a subset of the Cartesian product
of all possible combinations of chosen feature values.
Thus a typical test was specified by the frame type and
subtype, the fixed elements of the frame, and ranges of
values of varying elements. The resulting series of stimuli
frames was represented by a Ruby object, which exported an
iterator, which, when possible, also varied the MAC address
encoding the identity of the stimulus. This approach, natural for the Ruby style of programming, made for ease of programming such series of tests. We expect it to be even more
useful for further development of multi-stage tests, where
iterators can be combined to quickly create new tests.

4.4

Automated decision tree derivation

Although currently our database of test results is relatively small, and decision trees for device signature tests can
be easily derived by hand, we expect it to grow significantly,
reaching the point where signatures will need to be derived
in an automated way. We thus adapted a decision-list learning algorithm [12] with several heuristics to minimize the
depth of the resulting lists.10
Our choice of decision-list learning is partly due to the intuition that, compared to other popular techniques, it tends
to produce results that are typically more human-readable
(and thus easier to manually tweak if needed).

5.

EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

We used several scenarios from Sections 3.2 and 3.3 against
a number of APs and client stations. We included two
software-based APs, one based on the Atheros a/b/g card
and the madwifi-ng driver, and the other based on the Prism2.5
card and the hostap driver. The choice of these popular software solutions was motivated, in part, by the likelihood of
10

Please refer to our technical report [2] for more details
about our use of the original decision list algorithm and our
heuristics.

Figure 1: Cisco-Linksys WRT54g AuthFCTest

Figure 2: Extrasys WAP-257 AuthFCTest

Figure 3: Madwifi-ng soft AP AuthFCTest

Figure 4: HostAP soft AP AuthFCTest

their attack use in “evil twin” scenarios (e.g., with tools like
Karma).

5.1

Access Point fingerprinting

Our access points showed reproducible patterns of responses,
confirming our basic hypothesis. We show a visualization of
two series of our result tests in figures 1–5 and 6–10. All
APs were configured for open access in default configuration.
The first series (ProbeFCTest) tested responses to Probe Requests with varying FC flags, the second series (AuthFCTest)
tested responses to Authentication Requests with similarly
varying flags. We sent stimulus frames in random order to
avoid any patterns due to timing and sequence of individual
stimuli. Tests were repeated several times to minimize the
effects of frame loss due to transient network congestion or
other factors.
We visualize the results as follows. The 8 rows in each column represent the 8 FC bits, descending from high-order bit
to low-order bit. Bit cells are grey if set and black if unset.
Each column represents one of the 256 combinations of bits
we tested, and the width of a given column corresponds to
the relative frequency of responses to those bits in the test
series. Columns also fade out as their frequency decreases,
to emphasize the importance of the high-frequency columns.
These visualizations make apparent the differences in behaviors of the tested APs, except for the Linux-based Atheros
and madwifi-ng soft AP and the Aruba AP70 with OpenWRT firmware, which exhibit similar patterns.
We are working on resolving timing and frame-loss sensitivity issues to produce reliable fingerprinting patterns in
other scenarios.

5.2

Figure 5: Aruba OpenWRT AuthFCTest

Figure 6: Cisco-Linksys WRT54g ProbeFCTest

Figure 7: Extrasys WAP-257 ProbeFCTest

Station fingerprinting

Our station fingerprinting is a work in progress. Preliminary tests of scenarios from Section 3.3 with popular laptop
brands (e.g., MacBook Pro and those with Intel Centrino
chipsets) and portable devices (including an iPhone and a
Cicso 7920) showed that client stations tend to ignore deauthentication and disassociation frame bits and also tend to
attempt reconnection regardless of the Reason Code in these
frames. We observed differences in the numbers of recon-

Figure 8: Madwifi-ng soft AP ProbeFCTest

6.

Figure 9: HostAP soft AP ProbeFCTest

CONCLUSION

We tested a number of scenarios for active fingerprinting
of 802.11 MAC layer implementations that rely on exchanging crafted 802.11 frames with the fingerprinted device. Our
approach complements other fingerprinting approaches, and
can yield faster results, for defensive uses in particular. Our
results show this approach to be feasible for access points,
and also suggest promise in fingerprinting client stations.
We also present a visualization of our sample test results
and outline several directions for future investigation.
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Figure 10: Aruba OpenWRT ProbeFCTest

nection attempts and also in variation in timing of these
attempts for different Reason Codes; however, more experiments are needed to confirm this behavior. Using Probe
Responses as stimuli, however, produces a promising difference in behavioral patterns.
At present, we cannot realistically estimate false positive
and false negative rates of our approach, for several reasons.
Its active nature requires that we either own tested devices
or obtain explicit consent from owners. As a result, our
test equipment set is rather small. Following the example
of nmap and other classical tools in providing an open fingerprinting network and inviting community contributions,
we expect to significantly increase the recognized device set.
We note that since the actual set of deployed devices is a fast
moving target, providing such a framework is the only hope
that a free fingerprinting tool has of retaining its usefulness.

5.3

Incidental observations

In the course of our experiments we encountered 802.11
implementation behaviors that, although not described by
any standard, could, in combination with other features of
their respective platforms, have unexpected security implications.
Association behavior of a client station after introduction
of a rogue AP with a stronger signal provides several examples. The Shmoo group observed versions of Windows XP
prior to SP1 even leaving the selected ESSID and associating with a stronger signal AP without warning the user [9].
We observed similar behavior in Orinoco Gold cards under
an older version of a Linux orinoco cs driver.
We encountered an even more interesting behavior in the
Linux driver for the Intel 4965 a/b/g interface: in the presence of a stronger 802.11a AP advertising the same ESSID,
it would abandon its working 802.11g association and associate with the 802.11a AP instead (unless explicitly limited
to the b/g mode with an iwpriv call). In an environment
where 802.11b/g range is monitored by a WIDS, whereas
802.11a is not normally used or monitored, such switching
may facilitate a successful “under the radar” MITM attack.
We believe that classifying and cataloging such behaviors
should be a part of further behavioral fingerprinting.
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